Introduction
The Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice describes the law that covers admissions to hospital and treatment for mental disorders in children as 'complex' (Department of Health (DH), 2015) . This article will establish that, following P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] Mackenzie and Watts' (2014) call for procedural safeguarding through an extension of DoLS or any subsequent safeguarding system to apply equally to children.
Detention authorised under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) or if applicable under section 25 of the Children Act 1989 (CA), in which there are legislated procedural requirements and reviews, will not be considered in this discussion.
Deprivation of Liberty: The Gap between Children, Young People and Adults
The law under Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] provides that a competent child under the age of sixteen can consent to treatment, although where treatment is refused the courts almost always overrule any such decision (Cave, 2013) . The child under the age of sixteen who lacks capacity to make decisions regarding their health has their welfare protected under the CA, whereby parents have a responsibility to act in their child's best interests.
In the case of children with a mental disorder, the emphasis is on those children and young people receiving treatment that is decided to be in their best interests and to avoid deprivation of liberty through use of the MHA (Cave, 2013) . Cases concerning deprivation of liberty are most common outside of the MHA, where that child lacks capacity to consent to inpatient treatment through either a mental health disorder or a learning disability (Bowers and Dubicka, 2009) The DoLS were introduced following HL v UK [2005] , known as Bournewood, where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the hospital admission of a patient with learning disabilities and autism was a deprivation of liberty as he was not permitted to leave, consequently engaging Article 5 of the ECHR. Article 5 requires that such deprivation must be subject to judicial review and, as this was not provided for in the MCA, a gap was identified in the compatibility of domestic law and the ECHR, known as the 'Bournewood gap'. DoLS provides procedural safeguards to protect vulnerable adults who are not being detained under the MHA but are deprived of their liberty (Mackenzie and Watts, 2010) . Importantly, these do not apply to those under the age of eighteen, where common law and the CA are relied upon for those under the age of sixteen and the MCA for those aged sixteen and seventeen.
Therefore, within the scope of children's decision-making, deprivation of liberty outside of the MHA is differentiated from that of adults by the lack of legislative safeguarding procedures. The issue identified is how a lack of universal safeguarding can be compatible with Article 5, if the right to liberty is universal?
The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights
The right to liberty is provided under Article 5 of the ECHR. Domestic courts and the ECtHR in Strasbourg have both had to interpret the ECHR and apply it to the rights of children as holders of those rights rather than objects of protection (European Union Harbour (2008) explains that Nielson was heavily criticised on the basis that the child's views were not considered, particularly in the depth they would be today. Furthermore, as the duration of the admission was several months, there was concern that such a duration of treatment did amount to a deprivation of liberty (Harbour, 2008) .This point was most accurately articulated by Judge Salcedo, dissenting in Nielson, who held that 'the fact that a parent may legally, and without being subject to any judicial review, place a child in his custody in a psychiatric ward, in Bournewood, but effectively meant that the number of people deprived of their liberty was increased as a result of the widened definition (Penny and Exworthy, 2015) . In response, Stavert (2015) questioned whether the DoLS now satisfy the procedural requirement under Article 5. In particular, Stavert (2015) identified children and young people as being particularly vulnerable because of both the lack of safeguarding and the broad scope of health and social care settings that could potentially deprive liberty following Cheshire West. The Department of Health (2015) guidance following Cheshire West did not address the issues for those under the age of eighteen. It could be considered that the responsibilities expected of parents to the welfare of their children justify there being no additional safeguarding requirements. Wheeler and Crabb (2016) argued that parents are in a better position to make decisions because of the complex and differing needs of settings caring for children with a learning disability or mental health disorder with associated challenging behaviour. However, as highlighted by Penny and Exworthy (2015) , this fails to consider the potentially unlawful position in which Cheshire West has now placed 
The Scope of Article 5 for Children within English Law
The common law position of parental consent authorising treatment for mental health disorders, which could also amount to a deprivation of liberty, for children under the age of sixteen lacking capacity to consent, was established in a series of cases at the end of the twentieth century. In the cases of Re R [1991] and Re K, W and H [1993] the courts held that parental consent was valid for compulsory psychiatric treatment and did not require further court approval. While these cases related to refusal of treatment, they involved admission to secure, inpatient, psychiatric hospitals, the children were not free to leave and the treatment was not carried out under the MHA. Hawkins et al. (2011) argued that, if these cases were considered today in light of the Human Rights Act 1998, deprivation of liberty would be a central issue.
Despite the MCA not being applicable to children under 16, section 25 of the CA does allow for the courts to authorise local authorities to restrict the liberty of children. This is only where secure accommodation is necessary to prevent the child from absconding or to protect the child from self-harm or harming others, outside of a clinical setting. In authorising such a restriction, the courts must specify duration and that the child must be legally represented in any hearings.
In Re K [2001] the England and Wales Court of Appeal considered whether restricting liberty under section 25 of the CA was compatible with Article 5. Butler-Sloss P held that it was compatible because of the judicial review involved in such decisions and that it was within the jurisdiction of the courts to protect the child or others from and had a learning disability. He was placed into a care home because of difficulties in his home circumstances, which deprived him of his liberty as he was not free to come and go as he pleased. Although these were care proceedings and the issue was not parental consent, it is important to note that Roberts HHJ agreed that a section 25 order would not be appropriate since this would require Daniel to move to more secure accommodation. Therefore, the court ordered that Daniel stay where he was but (crucially in recognition of Article 5) that the order be reviewed in twelve months and that this time limit was for the courts to set to ensure that Daniel's rights were protected. Should the same level of procedural safeguarding not be required in the context of parental consent alone? The unsatisfactory answer, as argued by Keehan J, is that parental authority falls within the 'zone of parental control'.
The Zone of Parental Control
The concept of the zone of parental control was established in the MHA Code of Practice 2008 update. The concept was introduced to provide greater clarity for clinicians involved in decision-making with children and young people within mental health care, as the expectation to consider both legislation and evolving common law was far too great (Hawkins et al., 2011) . The zone of parental control allows parents to consent for treatment and inpatient admission through recognition of Nielson, although no definition was provided because the cases were dependent on the individual facts (Hawkins et al., 2011) . The concept of the zone of parental control was widely criticised. Watts and Mackenzie (2013) argued that its interpretation by clinicians was likely to be too subjective. In the case of psychiatric treatment of long duration, where a deprivation of liberty can occur without parental consent, Gillam 
(2010) raises concern over the ethical boundaries between this and short-term treatment admission. Gillam (2010) further describes the original concept as being so wide that a definition of the scope of parental control was needed.
Following Cheshire West, the MHA Code of Practice was updated in 2015 and attempted to expand on the concept. Specifically, the update included a section on the deprivation of liberty of children, recognising the complexities of such cases. The
Code of Practice requires that clinicians have regard to the degree of parental control and supervision that would be expected for a child of that age with the characteristics of the child in question. However, this approach fails to acknowledge that, if a child lacks capacity to consent, and this is not going to change in adulthood, why should parents not continue to provide such control after the age of sixteen? What is highlighted is the arbitrary consideration of age under domestic law, where the issue must be a broad subjective assessment, as is the case for adults under the MCA.
Parental authority through legislated responsibility exists to protect a natural element of parenting and it is without question that this is a feature of the upbringing of all children. However, as Akerele (2014) argues, it is not the case that this ordinarily involves inpatient secure care for a prolonged period of time.
The Code of Practice asks that, in establishing the limits of parental responsibility, account be taken of the child's rights under Article 5 and the rights of the parents under Article 8 in respect of family life. This relationship between the child's and parents' rights under the ECHR draws attention to the importance of Gillam's (2010) point about defining the scope of parental consent. Watts and Mackenzie (2013) suggested that all cases on whether a decision falls in the zone of parental control are 
published to provide a body of knowledge to clinicians. However, the cases are so fact specific and dependent on individual diagnosis and circumstance that this could create further confusion. Furthermore, it is recognised that clinicians and practitioners, faced with the expectation to interpret a complex body of case law, are already reluctant to accept parental consent without court approval . The challenge for clinicians is, as summarised by , to involve the parents whilst still ensuring that the child's rights under the ECHR are not breached. Keehan J appeared to dismiss this position in the first case of Trust A v X, favouring greater reliance on the parent's rights under Article 8 (the Right to Privacy and Family Life).
Reliance on this decision would allow that the breach of Article 5 can be avoided through parental consent and, therefore, that a child is deprived of liberty without safeguarding and judicial review.
Is it Common Sense?
Keehan J held that it would be disproportionate and without common sense to not allow parental consent to authorise the deprivation of liberty in D's case. Indeed, under English law, parents have the ability to consent for treatment or care providing it is in the best interests of the child, satisfying the welfare principle under the CA. In This proposal might be usefully amended to consider learning disability assessment as separate to mental health assessment. This separation is recognised by Herlihy and Holloway (2009) as being in line with the separation of learning disability from mental health disorder within current law. The assessments would allow for greater safeguards in considering deprivations of liberty for children but would also support the avoidance of a breach of Article 5, as they are intended to do in adults (Mackenzie and Watts, 2014) . Additionally they could also incorporate suggestion that the best interests test under the MCA be universally applied. Gratton (2013) further argues in favour of a holistic capacity assessment where it may have been assumed that a child lacks capacity based on a learning disability. Bartlett (2014) argues that there has to be recognition that safeguarding can be harmful to the wellbeing of those who do not need such intervention. However, it should be noted that such safeguards would remove the requirement of a subjective assessment by a clinician and recognise the importance of parental consent through a more holistic approach, involving the child as much as possible. Furthermore, safeguarding would allow a more consistent framework and provide an alternative to the current arbitrary age law.
There are further, potentially valid objections to this suggestion: whether these safeguards are needed when cases are already brought before the courts; and whether the increased guidance for deprivation of liberty in the 2015 MHA Code of Practice is sufficient enough for both clinicians and the courts. Regarding the former, the ECtHR recognised that UK law had insufficient safeguards for deprivation of liberty prior to the DoLS. The DoLS might be considered to be correcting a legal technicality but, as Kelly (2011) argues, in practice they also provide that a deprivation of liberty is justified and considered under a broad scope of assessment, allowing the Court of Protection to provide judicial review when required. Hawkins et al. (2011) suggest that the relationship between parents and clinicians would be better supported through the demonstration of a robust process to ensure that the child's best interests are being considered. Such would certainly be the case using the DoLS (Minors' Safeguards) and they would also be expected to reduce the use of the court by clinicians, healthcare trusts and local authorities to determine the zone of parental control. In response to the objection, it is true that the MHA Code of Practice has expanded in light of Cheshire West. However, it still requires clinicians and practitioners to make subjective judgements. Furthermore, if the law in Birmingham City Council v D and Trust A v X is to be applied, then this could result in an expectation by parents that the assessment in relation to rights, a safeguarding system that considers the issues in a broad context and through the skills of a number of professionals and the parents is preferable.
Conclusion
From the outset this paper has argued that decisions regarding deprivation of liberty in children under the age of sixteen should reflect, in part, parental choice. The cause for concern is the sovereignty of parental consent over all else. The law is confusing. In one respect rights under the ECHR are universal. However, in the context of these children's right under Article 5, courts have demonstrated an acceptance of the premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. However, where parental consent is not involved, the courts have supported the provision of such safeguards in the form of reviews. This juxtaposition seems ridiculous in the case of long-term inpatient care and clinicians have demonstrated their discomfort with this extension of the zone of parental control. It seems illogical for the law to allow a child to be provided with no legislated safeguarding, yet that same child be subject to legislative protection upon attaining the age of sixteen, or be provided with such protection if the court itself authorises a deprivation of liberty. This is particularly of concern when the child's capacity to make their own decisions about such matters is always likely to be limited. Such a state of affairs highlights the failed application of Article 5 to children, stemming from Nielson. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 parental consent, but it is parental consent having sovereignty over whether a child is being deprived of liberty that causes concern. The law is confusing, in one respect rights under the ECHR are universal, however in the context of these children's right under Article 5 the courts demonstrate an acceptance of the premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. Furthermore, there are wider potential issues for children being considered to be deprived of liberty following Cheshire West. This paper will specifically analyse the legal position of children under sixteen who lack capacity to make the decision to consent to long-term inpatient care. My main argument is that as a result of parental consent being recognised as holding legal 
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Deprivation of Liberty: The Gap between Children, Young People and Adults
The law under Gillick 10 enables the competent child under the age of sixteen to consent to treatment, although in the case of refusal of treatment the courts almost 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 29 Nielson was heavily criticised on the basis that the child's views were not considered in the depth they would be today. 30 Furthermore, that as the duration of the admission was several months, parental authority was questioned as to whether long term admission to inpatient treatment for a mental health disorder only required parental consent and whether such duration of treatment did amount to a deprivation of liberty. 31 This point was most accurately articulated by Judge Salcedo dissenting, who held that ' the fact that a parent may legally, and without being subject to any judicial review, place a child who in his custody in a psychiatric ward, constitutes a violation of Article 5
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The Scope of Article 5 for Children within English Law
The common law position of parental consent authorising treatment for mental health disorders, which could also amount to a deprivation of liberty for incompetent children under the age of sixteen, was established in a series of cases at the end of the twentieth century. As already highlighted the decision was that parents did have the authority to provide such consent and before continuing my argument that the decision was incorrect, it is worth noting the valid argument against common law establishing such a legal position. The scope of the common law could certainly be viewed as too broad and that the authority should be legislative in the case of mental health law to provide greater clarity and align with existing mental health legislation. 51 Indeed perhaps it is the role of Parliament to explore the issue of deprivation of liberty in children and through collaboration with parents, clinicians and practitioners.
The Zone of Parental Control
The concept of the zone of parental control was established in the MHA Code of Practice 2008 update. 52 The concept was introduced to provide greater clarity for clinicians involved in decision-making with children and young people, as the expectation to consider both legislation and evolving common law was far too subjective. 53 The zone of parental control allowed parents to consent for treatment and inpatient admission through recognition of Nielson, although no definition was provided because the cases were dependent on the individual facts. 54 The concept of 74 In response, such safeguards would I suggest remove the requirement of a subjective assessment by a clinician and recognise the importance of parental consent through a more holistic approach, involving the children in as much as possible. Furthermore, would allow a more consistent framework and provide an alternative to the current arbitrary age law.
There are further valid objections to this suggestion; whether these safeguards are needed when the cases are brought before the courts as it is and whether the increased guidance for deprivation of liberty in the 2015 MHA Code of Practice is sufficient enough for both clinicians and the courts. In response to whether these safeguards are needed, the ECtHR recognised that UK law had insufficient safeguards for deprivation of liberty prior to the DoLS. The DoLS can be considered to just be correcting a legal technicality but in practice they also provide that a deprivation of liberty is justified and considered under a broad scope of assessment, allowing the Court of Protection to provide judicial review when required. 75 Hawkins et al suggest that the relationship between parents and clinicians would be better supported through the demonstration of a robust process to ensure that the child's best interests are being but it is also suggested that they would reduce the role of the court being required by clinicians, healthcare trusts and local authorities to determine the zone of parental control. In response to the second objection that the MHA Code of Practice is sufficient for clinicians, it has to be recognised that the explanation has expanded in light of Cheshire West. However, it still remains subjective to those treating clinicians or practitioners. Furthermore, if the law in Trust A v X is to be applied, then this could result in an expectation by parents that they have authority following Keehan J's decision not to provide guidance for all cases of deprivation of liberty for those under
16
. 77 I therefore suggest that the MHA Code of Practice is insufficient and because of the complex nature of the assessment, in relation to rights, a safeguarding system of assessments that considers the issues in a broad context and through the skills of a number of professionals and the parents, is far more preferable.
Conclusion
From the outset I made clear that deprivation of liberty in incompetent children under the age of sixteen should undoubtedly in part include parental consent, but it is parental consent having sovereignty over whether a child is being deprived of liberty that causes concern. The law is confusing, in one respect rights under the ECHR are universal, however in the context of these children's right under Article 5 the courts demonstrate an acceptance of the premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 safeguarding, yet that same child be subject to legislative protection upon attaining the age of sixteen. This is particularly of concern when that child will never become competent to make their own decisions and highlights the failed application of Article 5 to children, stemming from Nielson.
I have only discussed long-term inpatient care but there has to be consideration of applying the suggested safeguarding to a broader context. This does indeed warrant further discussion beyond this paper and will likely be controversial. However, what should be paramount is that safeguarding would allow a more structured and multidimensional assessment, as is provided in adults, to establish the best interests of those who are unable to do so. Indeed the proposed amended DoLS (Minors' Safeguarding) should be viewed as a supportive scaffolding to promote a holistic and thorough assessment of the child's best interests, with recognition that parental views are paramount. If such treatment involves a deprivation of liberty, then the right to judicial review would be available. Most profoundly, adopting such safeguarding for children would correct the deficit that the ECtHR and the domestic judiciaries' interpretation of Article 5 has created, leading to the confusing cases that are now setting worrying precedents.
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